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ABSTRACT 
 
Equity market represents a significant source of funding companies' new development 
projects. However this investment process is not costless as minority shareholders bear a risk 
of dilution of their ownership stake in each financing round. Currently, there are some 
solutions how to reduce stock dilution risks and many studies about this issue but there is no 
study to offer an alternative solution to completely solve the problem without any further 
dilution possibility. We outline the existing mechanisms to fight dilution and draw conclusion 
evaluating the effectiveness of existing methods. It shows that current remedies of stock 
dilution are not met the requirements of the principles of property rights and anti-dilution 
provisions merely alleviate the dilution problem. We highlight advantages and drawbacks of 
current mechanisms and offer new solution that, to our assessment, outweighs current means 
to combat the dilution problem. It leads to designing a new model as an alternative to current 
anti-dilution provisions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The main function of capital market is to provide capital to companies. Companies 
benefit from this market through investments by the market participants who buy and sell 
equity and debt instruments. We divide the capital market into two various markets: primary 
capital market and secondary capital market. The primary capital market deals with the new 
securities, traded in this market. The secondary capital market is a market where securities 
are traded among investors not buying securities from directly the issuing company but from 
other owners of the market. As a rule, issuing companies get no revenue from trading process 
and benefits. Institutional and retail traders take part in these kinds of markets such as 
NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and other major exchanges around the world. 
At the other hand, companies use the primary capital market to generate funds for new 
investment programs at first through IPO (Initial Public Offering), then through secondary 
offering. While in secondary capital market traders trade among themselves, when it comes to 
Secondary offerings investors purchase securities directly from the company that issues new 
stocks after IPO. 
Equity offerings benefit the issuing company by attracting additional financial 
resources for its future development. Generally, equity capital is the main source of finance 
for small or young companies since this kind of companies are usually lack of capital (assets) 
for using collateral to borrow money from banks. Investors invest in companies through 
buying stocks in equity market. Thus, they become owners of the company sharing the 
ownership among other shareholders in proportion to the number of shares they hold.  
After IPO when companies need more funds to invest in new projects, they issue new 
stocks and sell them through secondary offering. The latter creates stock dilution, which 
decrease the economic value of the investor's investment in the entity. 
The secondary market is that part of the capital market that deals with the securities 
that are already issued in the primary market. In the secondary market, the money earned 
from selling a security does not go to the company. The money earned goes to the investor 
who sells the security. As a result, investors do business for profit by selling-buying stocks in 
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Stock Exchange Market and pay Capital gain taxes. 
 As mentioned above, the stock dilution is a decrease in the stock’s value. Regarding 
to the nature of above mentioned value, we deal with 2 types of dilution: 
Percentage dilution; 
Economic dilution. 
Percentage dilution decreases the voting power of old shareholders. In other words, 
percentage dilution is a situation when stock owners voting power decreases as the 
percentage of the ownership decreases because of more outstanding shares. For instance, let’s 
assume a company that has 5 shares and 5 people own one share each (each owns 20 percent 
equally as 5 shares compound 100 percent of the company’s share) decides to issue additional 
5 shares and sell it an outside single investor. Now the company has 10 shares outstanding 
and new investor owns 50 percent of shares (5 shares out of 10) or in other words 50 percent 
of the company. In this new situation, an initial owner of the company holds only 10 percent 
of the company, in other words 10 percent of shares outstanding (1 share out of 10). 
Therefore, initial owners loose the percentage of ownership in the company by 50 percent 
since their ownership in the company drops from 20 percent to 10 percent. Voting power 
(often called voting interest) is one form of economic interest. In the above mentioned case, 3 
initial shareholders (together comprising 60 percent of all votes, 3×20 percent) could select 
the board of directors that nominates CEO and thus, influence on the decisions of the 
company. After issuing new stocks, even 5 initial shareholders (comprising 50 percent of all 
votes, 5× 10 percent) could not independently exercise the right to select the board and have 
the same influence on making decisions of the company as before. 
Economic dilution is the reduction of the economic value of a company’s share. Economic 
dilution is subdivided into 2 types of dilution: 
1. Earnings dilution; 
2. Stock value dilution. 
Earnings dilution occurs when we have reduction of the earnings per share. Earnings per share 
(EPS) is the portion of a company's profit allocated to each outstanding share of common stock 
3 
 
  
 
which indicates the profitability of the company. The newly issued stocks increase the net in 
shares but the net income stays stable. Earnings per share are calculated by dividing net income 
by common shares outstanding during the period. Thus, a shareholder receives less amount of 
dividends per share than before, since now we have more total outstanding shares that means 
bigger denominator in EPS calculation formula and as a result, small earnings per share. 
Stock value dilution is the reduction of the stocks’ price. New equity offerings create 
greater supply that leads smaller demand for bigger quantity. Thus, the reduction in stock 
prices is inevitable according to the Law of Supply and Demand (The price adjustment 
mechanism). The economic value of any company’s stock is determined by the price of a 
stock plus Earnings per share (EPS). 
1.2. Structure of the paper  
        The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. In the first Chapter of the paper, 
we present general overview of stock dilution problem. We also set the research question here. 
Second Chapter of the thesis sets describes the methodology of the research of the paper. In 
Chapter III, we survey the prior literature, current legal regulations and courts’ decisions 
noting how they do not address the question we are looking forward to answer. We also 
examine current anti-dilution provisions in various legal systems showing their impotence to 
protect minority shareholders from dilution.  We discuss ways in which dilution damages 
shareholders property rights. In section IV we draw your attention to the findings of the 
analysis we have done. In Chapter V, we represent the study’s limitations. In the last, Chapter 
VI we draw conclusion answering the research question. In this chapter we also design 
theoretical new model as an alternative to current anti-dilution provisions.   
1.3. Research questions 
Are current stock issuance mechanism and anti-dilution provisions capable to solve stock 
dilution problem being compatible with the principles of the right to the property? 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The present study is mainly based on a review of existing literature and prestigious 
courts’ decisions. The method used to reach of the aims of this paper would be mainly 
qualitative. In addition secondary data will be used to advocate the arguments or reject them 
to come out a concrete conclusion. This study is aiming to evaluate current legal regulations 
and economic activities along with surveys, studies and the author’s knowledge and 
experience as a lawyer and policy maker in his government. This approach allowed not 
relying on any single methodology while providing an interrelated analysis of various aspects 
of companies’ issuance process. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Stock dilution as an economic problem 
The decision to issue new equity requires either the agreement of all shareholders or 
the board of directors (also known as the executive board) makes such decisions. In both 
cases each shareholder’s relative power of the ownership matters since the percentage of 
ownership in the company is directly proportional to each shareholder’s influence in the 
decision making process. In the first case, when shareholders’ agreement is needed for the 
decision to issue share capital each shareholder’s influence in the decision making process is 
direct but in the second case, when the executive board makes the decisions the influence is 
indirect as now the decision is made by members (board of directors) who have been elected 
by shareholders. Shareholders, that can’t afford to buy new shares find new stock issue 
process and following dilution bad news as they lose relative power in company’s decisions.  
Naturally, large investors whose stake is more than 50 percent in the company are 
concerned more as they may lose the control of selecting board of directors or making other 
major decisions and may dilute their ability to control stocks successive issues that require 
shareholder approval. Besides, existing shareholders lose investment when dilution occurs 
and the company’s stock prices go down. 
Atanasov, et al (2007) point out that equity dilution problem arises only when all of 
the following three conditions are met. Condition 1: A significant amount of equity is issued. 
If the size of the equity issue is small, shareholder wealth loss is negligible. 
  Condition 2: Some shareholders receive a disproportionately lower (higher) 
stake in the new issue. If all existing shareholders receive a proportionate amount of the 
newly issued shares, then there will be no dilution effects and the equity issue will resemble a 
stock split or a stock dividend. 
  Condition 3: Equity is issued at a lower price than the fair value of the stock. 
If the new stock is issued a fair value or even above fair value, regardless of participation or 
issue size, existing shareholders will not suffer a wealth loss.  
Although we agree that equity dilution may happen when above mentioned conditions are 
met, we are sure that equity dilutions is limited by the narrow definition of these conditions. 
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The difference of our views may be determined by the concept of the problem we take into 
account. In contrast to these researchers that neglect shareholders’ minor wealth loss 
excluding them from the notion problem, we, as a principle, highlight the importance of any 
economic loss regardless of the size. The dilution will get noticed when company issues 
comparably big number of new shares but it doesn’t mean if the economic loss is discernible 
to the naked eye it does not exist. In our opinion, any economic loss arising from legal 
regulations and not determined by purely economic natural rules is a situation regarded as 
unwelcome in terms of being harmful and needing to be dealt with to overcome. Thus, we 
consider even small wealth lossproblem in the equity issuing process. 
Regarding to the second condition, we should bear in mind that equity dilution is a 
reduction either in relative ownership (percentage dilution) or in economic value (stock price 
dilution and earnings per share (EPS) dilution). That means a shareholder has to purchase as 
many newly issued shares as his ownership percentage in the company, in order not to suffer 
percentage dilution. For instance, if a shareholder owns 20 percent of the company, he has to 
purchase at least 20 percent of newly issued shares to remain 20 percent owner of the 
company after the stocks issue. This actual requirement for avoiding the dilution is practically 
impossible for all shareholders as they have to invest more and more every time the company 
decides to issue new shares. Besides, the existing shareholders suffer economic loss too as 
economic dilution also happens and shareholders are deprived of a part of their initial 
investment. 
Finally, third condition is purely concerned with theoretical approach of the subject 
rather than its practical application. It’s true that if a company issues new equity in a fair 
value or more than this fair value, it won’t be any economic loss for existing shareholders. 
Here everything is depend on that if because it’s not possible in practice for a company to 
issue new shares and sell them in the market price or higher. This view is advocated by one of 
the basic concepts in economics, the Law of Supply and Demand (The price adjustment 
mechanism). New shares create more supply, thus, it reduces the price of stocks. Therefore, 
the reduction of a company’s stock price after issuing new shares is inevitable. Financial 
practitioners also alert about stock price fall after successive issue of new shares.  
In summary, equity dilution happens not only when above discussed three conditions 
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are met but practically anytime that a company issues new shares. 
Almost all financial practitioners agree that issuing new stocks reduces the price of 
the stocks. In theory, this view is coined by Scholes (1972) that is called price-pressure 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the decline in stock prices is determined by 
economic relationship between supply and demand, especially because the demand curve for 
stocks is downward sloping. The advocates of this hypothesis note that each company’s share 
is unique in stock market and there is no close substitution for stocks. Some researchers agree 
with the stock price reduction fact after new issue but they find different reason behind this 
phenomenon. For example, Myers and Majluf (1984) see stock price reduction as a result of 
inner information about the company’s performance. Management is assumed to know more 
about the company's real value than potential investors. Investors take the information of new 
issue as a bad news (potential bad performance) as they are afraid that company needs money 
to cover expenses, pay debts but not investing in new profitable projects.There is also 
opposite view that claims that new offerings by companies can be viewed as expanding of the 
company and therefore good news for the company’s performance. Martin and Thomas (2002) 
drew a conclusion from such studies that compensation plans that align management's 
interests with those of stockholders, including stock option plans, raise the company's stock 
price and benefit stockholders. Although this case is about option plans not about general 
seasoned equity, we should take into consideration that stock option plans are a form of 
compensation that can be done through issuing new shares.  
 In contrast, the opponents of price-pressure hypothesis argue that the curve of stock 
demand is horizontal rather than downward sloping because stocks of different companies are 
close substitutes taking into account the fact that stocks can't be unique because the price of 
all sock are determined by the risk and expected return that is common for all types of stocks. 
However, we agree with the second group of researchers as the stock market is under the 
general rule of economics, especially supply-demand rule: more stocks means more supply 
that will lead to price reduction in free economic market. This view has been asserted by a 
quantitative research done by Paul Asquith and David W. Mullins, Jr. (1983). The latter above 
discussed theories grouped into three categories:  
No price effect - consistent with the close substitutes - efficient markets hypotheses.  
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Negative price effect - consistent with (1) a downward sloping demand for firms’ 
shares leading to a permanent price reduction, (2) capital structure hypotheses based upon 
redistribution of firm value among classes of security holders, tax effects, and/or leverage-
related information effects, (3) information effects associated with the sale of equity by 
informed sellers, both firms and investors, and (4) large transaction costs associated with 
equity issues.  
Positive price effect - consistent with (1) a favorable information effect associated 
with investment, and (2) a value enhancing reduction in financial leverage due, for example, 
to a reduction in the expected costs of financial distress and/or agency costs. 
This study, examining the announcement day and issue day price effects of both 
primary and secondary issues of new equity, analyzed 531 registered common stock offerings 
by utilities and industrial firms (data has been taken from Wall Street Journal) and came to 
the conclusion that equity issues reduce stock prices. The regression results demonstrate that 
the announcement day price reduction is significantly related to the size of the equity offering. 
As bigger the size of new issued equity is, as big is the reduction of stock price. This 
conclusion is consistent with the price-pressure hypothesis that discussed above. It means that 
the demand for a company’s share is a downward sloping and new issued shares create 
dilution by pushing stock prices down.  
The results of this study also showed that new are security issues are generally 
viewed by knowledgeable investors as unfavorable signals about a company's performance 
and future prospects. This phenomenon can also describe the widespread situation when the 
most shareholders are reluctant to issue new shares.  
To explain why investors negatively react to seasoned equity Offerings, Kim, E. Han 
and Amiyatosh Purnanandam (2006) have done an empirical assessment of the relative 
importance of three theoretical explanations for the negative investor reaction and have 
concluded that of the three possible explanations, pure signaling effects and agency problems 
exhibit significant explanatory power. We notice the same tendency when it comes to stock 
option plans. Stock options are granted by companies to their employees as part of the 
employees’ compensation package. A company that issues Employee option plans (EPO) to 
its employees also set a particular price (generally company’s current stock price) at which 
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EPO can be exercised. Until recently, EPOs have been widely used by companies as a part of 
employee remuneration package, especially by start-up technology firms. Generally such 
companies are lack of asset and EPOs are the best option to save some financial resources 
when paying workers’ salaries. In these companies, workers hope to get more benefits from 
EPOs compensation when the company goes public. Nevertheless, the tendency in this sphere 
shows shareholders’ reluctance to EPOs as adverse form of compensation. Lublin and Scism 
(1999) notes that institutional shareholders are now concerned about the drawbacks of widely 
used stock option plans, particularly the potential dilution in earnings that would be caused if 
the outstanding shares are exercised. This means EPOs are assumed to be detrimental for 
shareholders. That is why Thomas and Martin (2000) report that “shareholder unfriendly” 
features in option plans cause shareholders to vote at significantly higher levels against 
option proposals. In our opinion this so called “shareholder unfriendly” features includes 
potential dilution. 
It is much more important to clarify who the stock dilution can be problem for. A 
seasoned issue is beneficial for the issuing company as it is source of funding regardless of 
potential dilution effect because the company as a legal entity can be indifferent to the fact 
that existing shareholders loose while new investors get benefits. It can be also beneficial for 
new investors who buy newly issued stocks in a lower price than before issuing equity by the 
company. The only victim target in this process is existing, in other words, old investors, as 
their ownership reduces. The financial history of the world is full of examples when financial 
instruments helped to despoil big company owners of their ownership. One of the most 
outstanding cases is the Erie War in 19th century. Erie war was a conflict between American 
financiers in the late 1860s to control the Erie Railway Company. The main characters in this 
conflict were Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jay Gould and Jim Fisk. Cornelius Vanderbilt (known as 
“The Commodore”) was a transportation magnate and the richest man in the US at that time. 
Jay Gould and Jim Fisk were Wall Street traders. 
As Geiss (2006) mentions Daniel Drew that became the best known and most feared 
stock trader of his era, by 1857, had become the director of Erie railroad and engaged in the 
infamous “Erie Wars” with Jay Gould and Jim Fisk against Cornelius Vanderbilt to gain 
control of the railroad between 1866 and 1868. Jay Gould and Jim Fisk brought to Daniel 
Drew on the board and conspiring with the help of the director “watered down” the stocks of 
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the company by issuing new shares. Cornelius Vanderbilt got manipulated by purchasing a 
large quantity of these watered stocks. Watered stock is a highly overvalued asset. The origin 
of the term is credited to Daniel Drew. Daniel Drew, a cattle driver turned financier in New 
York, had a reputation for shady behavior in business, and he was a major participant in many 
Wall Street manipulations of the 1850s and 1860s. Daniel Drew as a cattle drover and horse 
trader used to feed his animals excessive amount of water to make them look fat right before 
selling them. In this way he could sell them in insubstantial higher prices. Thus, Daniel Drew 
carried over the term watered stocks to stock markets meaning stocks that have been 
tremendously diluted. 
Using a quirk in the law, Drew, Gould, and Fisk began issuing additional shares of 
Erie stock for several rounds. The Commodore kept purchasing the watered shares. 
Vanderbilt was outraged, but kept trying to buy up the Erie stock as he believed his own 
economic might could outgun Drew and his cronies. Eventually, the Commodore lost more 
than $7 million in the process of attempting to gain control over Erie Railway Company.  
Another illustrative example, this time from modern financial era, is the case of 
billionaire Eduardo Saverin who is one of the co-founders of Facebook Inc. Eduardo Luiz 
Saverin, an alumni of famous Harvard University, is a Brazilian investor and Internet 
entrepreneur. In 2004, Mark Zuckerberg, along with other fellow Harvard College students 
Eduardo Saverin, Dustin Moskovitz, Andrew McCollum, and Chris Hughes established 
Facebook that later became Social networking giant corporation. Mark Zuckerberg first time 
met Eduardo Saverinhis junior year at Harvard asked him to deposit $15,000 in a bank 
account for business purposes. The money was anticipated to go toward the servers needed to 
host a website that Zuckerberg wanted to develop. The small start-up team divided the work 
among its members. Eduardo Saverin was in charge of setting up the company, get extra 
funding, and make a business model. All of a sudden Zuckerberg decided to cut Saverin out 
of the company as he thought Saverin had failed to do his duties properly. 
To bring the decision into realty, Zuckerberg established a new company, a Delaware 
corporation, to purchase the old company (Florida LLC) that ownership was shared by 
Saverin too. Delaware Corporation acquired Florida LLC and Zuckerberg distributed new 
shares to everyone excluding Eduardo. Now, in Facebook ownership the stake of Zuckerberg 
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was 65%, 30% for Saverin, and 5% for Moskovitz. After an investor, named Peter Thiel, 
invested $500,000 in the company getting 9% of the company, the portion of Zuckerberg, 
Saverin, and Moskovitz became accordingly 40%, 24% and16%. Zuckerberg offered 3 
million shares to Saverin (shareholder agreement) to give up claim on all 
Facebookintellectual property rightsand turn over his voting rights to Mark Zuckerberg.It 
made Saverin a passive investor. Right after that Zuckerberg printed 9 million more shares 
and distributed to everyone but Saverin. He took 3.3 million new stocks and distributed 4 
million shares to Sean Parker and Dustin Moskovitz equally. The stock issuance process 
instantly diluted Saverin's stake in the disputed company from ~24% to 10%. Therefore, 
several rounds of seasoned equity offerings diluted Saverin’s ownership stake in the company. 
Zuckerberg's plan succeeded through using his position in the company to print new 
shares and reduce Saverin's stake in Facebook diluted its stocks. As of 2015, Saverin owned 
approximately 0.4% of all outstanding shares of the company. 
A famous movie named Social Network portrays the relationship between Saverin 
and the Company’s CEO Zuckerberg from their creation of Facebook to Saverin's legal action 
against Zuckerberg. The movie is based on the book of Ben Mezrich called The Accidental 
Billionaires. 
As seen, selling seasoned issued equity shifts the wealth from ‘existing’ shareholders 
to the favour of ‘new’ shareholders. The recent studies also show expropriation of the wealth 
of minority shareholders when issuing new shares for investment. For instance Atanesov, et al 
(2006) and Baek, Kang and Lee (2005)in their studies shows evidences of controlling 
shareholders respectively in Bulgaria and in Korea often avoids equity offerings to raise new 
capital and also shows the regression results as an evidence of expropriate the wealth of 
minority shareholders by the companies through diluting their ownership stake. 
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3.2. Existing methods for solving dilution problem, their capability of completely solving 
it 
 
As seen, stock dilution is inevitable when companies go for seasoned issues to raise 
extra capital for programs needing investment. Investors seek protection of possible dilution 
as they may lose a part of their ownership stake in the company.  
Anti-dilution provisions are anticipated to satisfy such needs maintaining 
shareholders' voting power, influence on the Board of Directors and minority shareholders' 
property rights. 
We divide anti-dilutions mechanisms into two groups: 
Anti-dilutions methods that are directly prescribed by law (we will call these methods legal 
solutions) and anti-dilutions methods that are not directly prescribed by law but have been 
widely used throughout time on a basis of freedom of contracts andfree will (on which terms 
to contract) which plays central role in the  contractual relationships (we will call second 
group's methods practical solutions). 
 
3.2.1. Legal Solutions 
 
Someone may think that modern legal systems provide solid guarantees for existing investors 
not to suffer economic loses using their voting power when company decides whether or not 
there is a need to issue new securities. However, the reality is so much different than our 
expectations. 
Constituting one third of the world's stock market, United States stock market is the 
largest in the world. The USA has got rich traditions and valuable experience in this sphere 
which is indispensable asset for other countries’ stock markets in general and for emerging 
markets in particular. In 1940, after stock market crash of 1929 in the USA, the US Congress 
passed Investment Company Act that regulates companies’ responsibilities and duties in 
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investment relationships with potential and existing investors. Investment Company Act of 
1940 followed two other important acts: the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. According to Section 23 (Distribution and repurchase of securities: 
closed-end companies) of this act:  
 (a) No registered closed-end company shall issue any of its securities (1) for services; 
or (2) for property other than cash or securities (including securities of which such registered 
company is the issuer), except as a dividend or distribution to its security holders or in 
connection with a reorganization.  
(b) No registered closed-end company shall sell any common stock of which it is the 
issuer at a price below the current net asset value of such stock, exclusive of any distributing 
commission or discount (which net asset value shall be determined as of a time within forty-
eight hours, excluding Sundays and holidays, next preceding the time of such determination), 
except (1) in connection Sec. 24 INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 68 with an 
offering to the holders of one or more classes of its capital stock; (2) with the consent of a 
majority of its common stockholders; (3) upon conversion of a convertible security in 
accordance with its terms; (4) upon the exercise of any warrant outstanding on the date of 
enactment of this Act or issued in accordance with the provisions of section 18(d); or (5) 
under such other circumstances as the Commission may permit by rules and regulations or 
orders for the protection of investors.  
(c) No registered closed-end company shall purchase any securities of any class of 
which it is the issuer except— (1) on a securities exchange or such other open market as the 
Commission may designate by rules and regulations or orders: Provided, That if such 
securities are stock, such registered company shall, within the preceding six months, have 
informed stockholders of its intention to purchase stock of such class by letter or report 
addressed to stockholders of such class; or (2) pursuant to tenders, after reasonable 
opportunity to submit tenders given to all holders of securities of the class to be purchased; or 
(3) under such other circumstances as the Commission may permit by rules and regulations or 
orders for the protection of investors in order to insure that such purchases are made in a 
manner or on a basis which does not unfairly discriminate against any holders of the class or 
classes of securities to be purchased. (Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, title I, Sec. 23, 54 Stat. 825.) 
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As seen, above mentioned Section is related to merely closed-end companies. A 
closed-end fund is a publicly traded investment legal entity. In contrast to closed-end 
companies, open-end funds are excluded from this Section. It is worth to mention that most 
of mutual funds are open-end funds that do not have restrictions on the number of issuing 
new shares. Neither other provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 nor the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contain similar restrictions 
indicated in Section 23 for open-end funds. Anyway, in summary Section 23 four major 
means of protection for existing sharehoders to avoid stock dilution: prevention of issuence 
of shares to pay for services, preemtive rights, minimum issue price and approval rights. 
Prevention of Issuence of Shares to Pay for Services 
Part a) of the Section 23 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 clearly states that no 
registered closed-end company shall issue any of its securities (1) for services; or (2) for 
property other than cash or securities. Here is a strong method of protection from complete 
dilution of stocks. 
Preemtive Rights 
Preemtive rights (often called preemption rights, "first option to buy'', subscription 
priviledge or subscription rights) give existing shareholders the right to purchase new issued 
shares by the company. A preemptive right is a privilege granted to existting shareholders to 
buy newly issued sharesprior to those shares being available for outside investers. Moreover, 
it is a right for existing shareholders to purchase new shares on not less favorable terms 
(including the price) or at least, on the same terms as outside investors.This rightis limited 
to the number of equity securities required to maintain existing shareholders' respective 
percentage ownership positions in the issuer. In other words, as a rule, a limit is put on the 
number of newly issued shares a  shareholder can buy depending the exact proportion the 
shareholder holds in the company in order to prevent dilution but not to strengthen his 
position in the company.  In this sense, preemtive rights are more common in Venture 
capital deals where after each round of financing the company's some existing shareholders 
want to preserve their ownership stake and take part in new investment. To maintain its 
power in the company's decision making process an existing shareholder must purchase new 
shares on a pro-rata basis. This means if a shareholder has got let's assume 30 percent of 
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outstanding shares of the company before the issuance, he/she needs to buy at least 30 
percent of newly issued shares not to suffer from dlution and to maitain the same power in 
the company after issuance he/she had before it. A preemtion right guarantees purchasing of 
not more than 30 percent of new shares in the above mentioned hyphotetical case since 30 
percent of new shares is enough for the shareholder not to be deluted. 
Besides being an useful protection tool from dilution, this right can be immensely 
valuable for existing shareholders especially when the company does well and there is a high 
expectetions from its future prospects. 
One of the important feature for preemtive rights is transferibility of the right. 
Preemtive rights are securitised and shared between shareholders who can easily sell that 
rights to third parties. Smith (1997) notes that only 50 percent of existing shareholders 
exercise their preemptive rights in the USA, while 40 percent of shareholders sell them. It 
means the other 10 percent suffer dilution.   
Although most legal system contains preemtive rights in their unti-dilution protection 
arsenal, these rights are given only to closed-end funds' shareholders in the USA by law but  
for other corporations it is neither default, nor mandatory. Anyway, preemtive rights are  
enforceble when such privilege is written into the contract regardless wether or not the 
concrete states grant this right as a matter of law.Discussing contract is an agreement between 
existing shareholders and the company upon shareholders such right and specific details of 
exersicing that right.  
Despite above mentioned advantages, preemtive right has also weaknesses. In 
particular, not all aspects are regulated by laws or by the contracts giving shareholders 
preemptive rights. For instance, in most legal systems it is not clarified if the payment for 
new shares will be in cash or in other ways: such as future services, other companies shares. 
Non-cash payments might create dilution as well. Another drawback of preemptive rights is 
waivability. Preemptive rights can be waived by majority shareholders vote. It means 
controlling shareholders can easily use their influence on decision making process and dilute 
minority shareholders stake of ownership in the company. Besides, preemptive rights are 
shareholders' rights to be capable by law to act to prevent dilution, not the rights to never 
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suffer from it since if a shareholder can't make new investment to buy new shares, his 
ownership stake will be diluted. 
 Minimum Issue Price 
Minimum issue price is a pricing rule that forbids the issuing company to issue new 
shares below certain price. As such price usually serves Net Asset Value (also called Book 
Value). Net Asset Value (NAV) is the value of an entity's per share: assets including market 
value of all the securities held by the fund plus cash and equivalent holdings, minus the funds 
expenses/liabilities, divided by the total number of outstanding shares. In some countries the 
pricing rule is fair value or market price of shares instead of NAV. In all cases manipulation 
of the calculation is a big threat in practice. First of all, it is difficult to determine fair value. 
In case of market price, controlling shareholders often use wash sales or maneuvers to press 
minority shareholders to sell their shares (Freeze-out). Finally, when NAV is related to 
pricing rule, accounting various manipulations (for example, showing excessive liabilities) 
come to help controlling shareholders. However, regardless of the fact that pricing rule is 
based on whether NAV or fair value per share, minimum price is able to reduce dilution or 
minimize its adverse consequences but is not able to eradicate it. Another important thing is 
that Investment Company Act of 1940 enforces minimum issue price rule above NAV price 
to only closed-end funds and although it is also theoretically possible for other companies to 
have such agreements, it doesn’t happen in real life. Khorana, et al (2002) shows that only 
few companies were able to issue new equity above NAV price in the last 30 years. Basically, 
we see companies that come to agreement upon pricing rule based on certain price and 
number of shares rather than NAV. For instance, Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd.’s 
Announcement in 2016 on adjustments to minimum issue price and maximum number of 
shares to be issued under the non-public issuance of a shares. According to this 
Announcement, pursuant to the Issuance Plan, the issue price of the non-public issuance of A 
shares of the Company (the “Non-Public Issuance”) shall be not less than RMB3.85 per share, 
and the number of shares to be issued shall not exceed 2,548,716,883 shares (find full text 
attached in Appendix). 
Like preemptive rights, minimum issue price also has disadvantage in the form of 
waivability of the right. Preemptive rights can be waived by majority shareholders vote. It 
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means controlling shareholders can easily use their influence on decision making process and 
dilute minority shareholders stake of ownership in the company.  
Approval rights 
An approval right is a right given to shareholders to control new equity issuance 
process. If the majority of shareholders approve, the company can issue new shares to anyone 
at any price. A company's power to issue new shares is regulated by the Companies Act of 
1993.Aspects that are not subject to the Companies Act of 1993 are determined by the 
contents of the company's constitution (or often called charter document). Issuing new equity 
at a certain number and price is most of time at the board of directors' discretion according to 
companies' constitutions. But if there are some restrictions in the company's constitution for 
the board of directors to issue new equity, such restrictions can be overcomed by 
shareholders' approval. This is done by a special resolution of shareholders, which usually 
requires a 75 percent majority. Although Investment Company Act of 1940 requires less 
votes, simple majority but a majority for all shareholders and not for existing shareholders 
present in the voting process. Even this requirement is difficult too satisfy as most of small 
investors are passive, inexperienced and as usual reluctant to take part in voting processes.  
Approval rights are able to overcome other restrictions too. For instance, companies 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange are required to submit approval of their shareholders 
when number of new equity issue shares exceeds 20 percent of outstanding shares. 
Atanasov, et al (2007) examining preemptive rights, minimum issue pricing rule and 
approval rights come up with a conclusion that these rights are not able to protect all 
investors equally and their effectiveness will depend on the distribution of investors in a 
particular firm. 
 3.2.2. Practical Solutions 
 Most common anti-dilution practical solutions are the weighted average and 
permanent, full-ratchet, anti-dilution protection.  
Weighted Average 
Weighted average is a common price anti-dilution protection method. Naturally 
investors’ concern that in every round of financing new shares can be at a lower price than 
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the price they paid per share when acquiring their shares.  Therefore, the investor will insist 
upon anti-dilution protection not to suffer from potential dilution. Weighted average is a 
mechanism that adjusts existing investors’ number of shares to the price of new shares. For 
example, an investor wants to purchase 40% of the company by investing $400,000 to get 
400,000 shares. It means he pays $1 for a share. The company had 600,000 shares before the 
investment. Now the company has 1,000,000 shares (600,000+400,000) and costs $1,000,000 
($1×1,000,000 shares). In the next financial round another investor offers $500,000 for 
getting 50% of the company. As the company has 1,000,000 shares it needs to issue 
additional 1,000,000 shares to give the new investor to satisfy that 50% request. It means new 
investor purchases 1,000,000 shares paying $500,000 or $0.5 for each share while first 
investor paid $1 for each share. First investor paid $400,000 but his shares now worth 
$200,000 (400,000 shares × $0.5) and his ownership drops from 40 percent to 20 percent. 
Therefore, first investor ownership stake is diluted. In order to compensate first investor’s 
loses the company reprice the shares using the following formula: 
CP2 = CP1 * (A+B) / (A+C), where: 
CP2   =    New Series A Conversion Price 
CP1   =    Series A Conversion Price in effect immediately prior to new issue 
A      =    Number of shares of Common Stock deemed to be outstanding immediately 
prior to new issue (includes all shares of outstanding common stock, all shares of outstanding 
preferred stock on an as-converted basis, and all outstanding options on an as-exercised basis; 
and does not include any convertible securities converting into this round of financing) 
B      =    Aggregate consideration received by the Corporation with respect to the new 
issue divided by CP1 
C      =    Number of shares of stock issued in the subject transaction 
If we put our values to above mentioned formula we get CP2=$0.75  
As a share has been reduced from $1.00 to $0.75, initial 400,000 shares of preferred 
stocks should convert into 533,333 shares of common stock. Therefore the company has to 
give the first investor additional 133,333 shares of common stock. 
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The biggest problem with this kind of anti-dilution protection is the imperfection of 
the formula. Particularly, it does not work properly with big numbers in subsequent financial 
rounds. 
 Financial practitioners also alert about this problem. For instance, Destin (2009) 
(Fred Destin joined Accel in 2014 and focuses on consumer and software investments. He is 
the lead investor and board member at Deliveroo, Pillpack and KNC. Prior to Accel, he was a 
partner at Atlas Ventures for 10 years) explains this problem on an example: ''Imagine the 
following happens: the pre-money valuation on your next round is less than the cash you 
raised previously. Say your company is in difficulty and raises $10M at $10M pre-money, 
having raised $10M previously. Because the anti-dilution calculation is iterative, guess what, 
the share price mathematically converges to… zero. Legally it will be set at the par value, say 
€0.0001. 
Your ownership just evaporated. You are now relying on people’s ethics, sense of 
fairness, or belief that long-term you don’t build venture firms by screwing entrepreneurs.'' 
In our opinion, the protection of investors’ rights can't merely relied upon people’s 
business ethics when there is a serious risk of losing ownership. All these relationships 
should be regulated in a legal state. 
Full-ratchet anti-dilution 
A “full ratchet” provision is the simplest type of anti-dilution provision. Full ratchet 
works by simply reducing the conversion price of the existing preferred to the price at which 
new shares are issued in a later round. So if an investor purchased 1,000 shares of preferred 
stock with full-ratchet anti-dilution protection for $10,000, or $10 per share, and in a future 
down round the company sells shares for $5 per share, the investor’s preferred stock would 
be convertible into 2,000 shares of common stock ($10,000 ÷ $5), and each share of preferred 
stock would be convertible into two shares of common stock. In essence, the existing investor 
gets the benefit of the new, lower per share price for her prior investment. As a result, the 
common shareholders are significantly diluted just because they issued a single new share. As 
a rule next round investors don’t like full ratchet given to previous investors and they usually 
offer only two possible solutions to overcome the problem either original investors waive 
their full ratchet protection provisions or new investor walks away from the deal. 
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Full ratchet is easy and it’s the most advantageous way to handle dilution from the 
preferred investor’s standpoint but it is the most risky for the holders of any common 
stock. Thus, full-ratchet is the most burdensome on the common stockholders and it can have 
significant negative effects on later stock issuances.  With this approach, the common 
stockholders bear all of the downside risk. 
Full ratchet also makes later investment rounds more difficult. It is similar to give an 
investor a power of veto to control the company's next issuance as new investors have to get 
previous investor’s permission to raise any capital. 
Fenwick & West LLP (2009) analyzed the terms of venture financings for 89 
companies headquartered in the Silicon Valley showed that 97% of down rounds had a 
weighted-average, only 3% are full ratchet (0% have no anti-dilution provision). Therefore, 
the practice considers weighted-average more effective anti-dilution provision than full 
ratchet and besides, always seeks anti-dilution protection, otherwise shareholders know they 
will suffer dilution.  
In summary, neither current legal nor practical solutions are effective enough to 
overcome dilution problem and protect minority shareholders from suffering losing their 
ownership. Current anti-dilution methods are merely capable to alleviate the dilution problem 
but are not completely solve it. 
 
        3.3 Right to property 
        It is of key importance to understand the difference of possession both in economic 
and legal sense. Historically, possession of goods has preceded the right to possess of goods. 
As Antony M. Honoré (1961, p. 115) says: ‘To have worked out the notion of ‘having a right 
to’ as distinct from merely ‘having’ … was a major intellectual achievement. Without it 
society would have been impossible.  … It is not enough for a legal system to recognize the 
possibility of people owning things. There must be rules laying down how ownership is 
acquired and lost and how claims to a thing are to rank inter se.’ 
        Atanasov, et al (2007) state that in order for an equity market to flourish, it has to 
develop mechanism that limits the dilutive consequences of equity issues, thus, the law is an 
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important mechanism that serves such preventive role in many markets and a variety of legal 
statutes have been designed to address dilution. 
Researchers, as a rule, have examined either ownership in the light of economics or 
jurisprudence but not the notion of possession as a compound phenomenon. This existing 
reality is somehow natural, as those researchers were either economists or lawyers and their 
main objective was to satisfy their professional needs and interests. It rarely happens when a 
researcher is both economist and lawyer to examine an issue in comprehensive manner. 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson (2004) mentions “legal theorists and other commentators have long 
established a distinction between property and possession. According to this usage adopted 
here, possession refers to control of a resource, but property involves legally sanctioned 
rights. Strikingly, much of the ‘the economics of property rights’ literature concentrates on 
possession, ignoring or downplaying the issue of legitimate legal rights”.  
Possession is a relationship between a legal person and a thing. It is physical control 
of the things, in other words, actual ownership while de jure ownership is a right to control 
the things including the formal title of ownership recognized by the authority. Therefore, if a 
de facto possession is a relationship between a legal person and a thing, legal ownership is a 
relationship between the owner, the state and third parties. Third parties are people who are 
obliged to regard the owners’ property rights, stay abstained from breaching their property 
rights, while the state has the obligation to regulate parties’ duties and rights in this process 
not to leave a room where legitimate expectations of owners or other parties can suffer a loss. 
We differentiate two types of property: personal property and real property.  Personal 
property (often called movable property) is anything other than land, such as money, stocks, 
patents, copyrights, intangible property. Real property (also referred to as immovable 
property) is land and anything attached directly to land including buildings, mines, ponds, 
dams. Personal property is itself subdivided into two categories: tangible and intangible. 
Tangible property includes all goods that can be touched, such as jewelry, buildings.  
Intangible property refers to all goods that can’t be touched as they don’t have any physical 
substance, for example patents, copyrights, stocks, bonds and other securities. Stocks held in 
companies are considered as personal properties throughout the whole word. We can’t touch, 
hear, taste or see a stock. A share of stock is a certificated paper representing someone’s 
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ownership in the corporation.  
The right to property is guaranteed in many international legal acts. For instance, 
Article 17 of Universal declaration of human rights of 1948 states: 
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
Another important document is the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”). European convention is an 
international agreement between European countries to protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Countries who want to become member of European Council have to ratify this 
agreement. European convention’s provisions operate in 47 European countries, thus making 
European convention as the main legal source in Europe. According to Article 1 of the first 
Protocol of the European Convention: 
 (1) Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
(2) The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
Article 1 of the first Protocol of the European Convention contains 3 rules: 
1. The principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions that is set out in the first sentence 
of the Article 
2. Deprivation of property  
3. Control of the property rights 
The principle of peaceful enjoyment is an opportunity given to an owner to enjoy his 
ownership without any interference by the state or other people. Interference of the state to 
the first rule is permissible when there is a solid public interest (deprivation of property) or 
when it pursues general interest (Control of the property rights). States should aspire to set 
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fair balance between public interests and people’s fundamental rights, thus, the limitations of 
certain rights should not only pursue legitimate aim but also the measures to achieve such an 
aim should be proportionate to the pursued aim. The states have the margin of appreciation to 
deal with this proportionality but it is still binding with the principles of the European 
Convention. A court should always take into consideration if there were alternative solutions 
with less negative effects for owners when evaluating the proportionality of the means of 
interference in relation to the pursued aim.  
Not only tangible goods but also assets including claims can be qualified as 
possessions when it is established properly. The claim is established properly when it is 
prescribed by law which make it enforceable. U.S. Supreme Court (1945) states “not all 
economic interests are "property rights;" only those economic advantages are "rights" which 
have the law back of them, and only when they are so recognized may courts compel others 
to forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion. ... Such economic 
uses are rights only when they are legally protected interests”. 
In case of stock dilution we have economic legitimate expectations that are not 
protected in legal level. Any investor, regardless of the amount of money he invests and his 
relative power in the company expects his property to be protected by law. In other words, 
although minority shareholders suffer actual economic loses, there is no effective legal 
remedy to be protected from losing their property.  
Generally, shareholders are not considered “victims” under European Convention,  
legal persons whose personal interests have been directly affected could have that status. 
ECHR in the case of Agotexim v. Greece (In this case as the company's business continued to 
decline, the shareholders' general meeting decided on 30 August 1983 to wind up the 
company and appointed two liquidators) states that shareholders, as a general rule, have no 
claim based on economic losses sustained by the company unless they show they have nor 
been able to use the remedies given in domestic level. ECHR notices that their complaint was 
based exclusively on the proposition that the alleged violation of the company's right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of its possessions had adversely affected their own financial interests 
because of the resulting fall in the value of their shares.  They considered that the financial 
losses sustained by the company and the latter's rights were to be regarded as their own, and 
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that they were therefore victims, albeit indirectly, of the alleged violation.  In sum, they 
sought to have the company's corporate veil pierced in their favour. ECHR further points out 
it is a perfectly normal occurrence in the life of a limited company for there to be differences 
of opinion among its shareholders or between its shareholders and its board of directors as to 
the reality of an infringement of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of the company's 
possessions or concerning the most appropriate way of reacting to such an infringement, such 
differences of opinion may, however, be more serious where the company is in the process of 
liquidation  but anyway the applicant didn’t show that the liquidators failed to do their duties 
properly. 
Actually, the ECHR said that the company should have applied to the Court as a legal 
entity but not their shareholders. It means Court examined not the current mechanisms 
correspondence to the Convention especially to the right to property guaranteed by the 
Convention but procedural correspondence of the case to current mechanisms operating in 
most countries. That is why one of judges, Mr. B. Walsh expressed his dissenting opinion; 
 
“1.    Joint stock companies are simply commercial devices for raising 
capital, particularly when large sums are required which would normally 
be beyond the private means of individuals.  Nevertheless if such a 
company fails the ultimate losers are the individual shareholders. 
They have the power to liquidate the company even when it is doing 
well.  They are the beneficial owners of the assets even though the 
legal ownership rests in the legal entity of the body corporate. 
 
2.    While it is true to say that such a body corporate has neither 
a soul to be damned nor a body to be beaten, nonetheless, the 
shareholders have and the existence of the corporate entity gives no 
protection to the shareholders as individuals against the loss in value 
of their shares or against criminal or civil liability for their 
individual activities in the commercial advancement of the companies. 
 
3.    It appears to me to be anomalous that the defense of human rights 
in the field of property, or otherwise, should yield to the 
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commercially sacred impenetrability of the "corporate veil". 
 
4.    In the present case the fact that the applicants are themselves 
bodies corporate does not affect the principle because such bodies are 
composed of individuals each of whom has property rights.  Shareholders 
may complain of the violation of their own rights and insofar as they 
complain of injustice to their corporate image they are in fact seeking 
to protect their individual property rights to the extent thereof. 
 
5.    Ordinary joint stock companies are to be distinguished from 
special bodies created by statute or by royal grant which may not in 
fact have any shareholders. 
 
6.    In my opinion the applicant bodies may be treated as the 
collective face of the individual victims.” 
 
We do agree with the judge, Mr. Walsh that institutions are means to serve the people 
not the contrary: as legal entities the existence of companies is justified as a form of 
cumulative power, skills, and investment of people that serves their economic interests. 
Barzel (1997), distinguishing “economic property rights” which is the ability to enjoy the 
property and “legal (property) rights” that the state assigns to a person, notes that economic 
rights are the end whereas legal rights are the means to achieve the end. Legal rights play a 
primarily supporting role. Therefore, we believe that a state should regulate such 
relationships in a way that not only majority shareholders’ but everyone’s property in the 
company is protected by law. 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) recalls in his cases that European 
Convention is a “living instrument” which, must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions (Judgment: Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 1978). ECHR in the case of Henaf v. 
France (Judgment: Henaf v. France, 2003) points out: “... certain acts which were classified 
in the past as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ as opposed to ‘torture’ could be classified 
differently in future. It takes the view that the increasingly high standard being required in the 
area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and 
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inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of 
democratic societies ...” 
This means that the European Convention develops the content of concrete human 
rights. Thus, human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention are in dynamic 
development and not in a condition of static stagnation. In other words, a mechanism that is 
in conformity with certain human rights at an exact point of time may contradict to them in 
future.  
       States have negative binding obligations under the European Convention not to 
interfere enjoyment of a person’s possessions. But the authority also has positive obligations 
to provide effective means of ownership protection taking account owners’ legitimate 
expectations. A state is not only obliged to stay abstained from breaching someone’s rights to 
property but to regulate the relationship between owners in the process of exchanging 
property, doing businesses together, investing through funds that accumulates many people’s 
wealth, thus protecting everyone’s and every single owner’s rights to property. Grgic, et al 
(2007) mention that in determining the effects of legal relations between individuals on 
property, the Conventions organs check that the law did not create such inequality that one 
person could arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of property in favour of another. 
      As seen, states mostly left the regulation of fighting stock dilution to contractual 
relationships (practical anti-dilution solutions) which doesn’t include under the scope of 
Article 1 of 1st protocol of the Convention. Therefore, investors are not capable of having 
effective remedies to protect their legitimate interests. However, first sprouts of the need to 
take into account above mentioned concerns have already been seen in dissenting opinions of 
ECHR decisions. 
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Chapter IV 
Findings 
       Stock dilution is a big problem especially in emerging markets where in one hand, 
lack of institutional traditions peculiar to financial markets, in the other hand, low legal 
awareness and underdeveloped legislation in financial services industry, create devastating 
threat on losing investors’ ownership. Dilution is practical problem rather than a pure 
theoretical one since it causes unacceptable wealth transfer from minority shareholders to the 
firm controlling ones. 
       Although a state’s legitimate interests lay in the need to protect everyone’s wealth 
regardless of the extent of their ownership in the company, minority shareholders in fact are 
not protected properly from adverse effects of stock dilution.  
       Neither current legal nor practical solutions are effective enough to overcome 
dilution problem and protect minority shareholders from suffering economic losses. Current 
anti-dilution methods are merely capable to alleviate the dilution problem but are not 
completely solve it. 
Current situation of weak and therefore discriminatory wealth protection of minority 
shareholders contradicts to the principles of the right to property.  
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Chapter V 
Limitations of the study 
The main limitation of this study is the lack of existing literature (almost no literature) 
combining economic and legal aspects of the problem and overreliance on economic 
literature. Empirical research could not be done due to spatial and time constraints. This 
paper is thus based solely on courts decisions and a review of the findings of existing relevant 
studies. Besides, although suggested model solves the problem of dilution for shareholders, 
the study does not pay attention to economic possible impacts of suggested model on the 
activity of corporations regarding to the amount of investment they get according to current 
mechanism and also the influence of this model on state’s overall economy. These are 
questions of further examination.  
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Conclusion 
Modern anti-dilution provisions are not able to completely solve stock dilution 
problem to protect minority shareholders’ wealth in the corporation. Current stock issuance 
mechanism might not directly contradict to the present perceptions of the right to property, 
but it doesn’t correspondent to the nature of above mentioned right having problems with the 
principles of it. We predict with full of hope, that both new researches on this topic and 
lawmaking process with the support of practical improvements and developments of human 
rights especially through activities of prestigious courts will lead to a big challenge to change 
traditionally accepted mechanism of stock issuance as soon as possible to bring it into 
conformity with the principles of the rights to property. 
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Alternative model 
        First of all we want to draw your attention that the main objective of this paper is 
nit to design a new model with comprehensive research. We just want o give an idea rather 
than ready model about one of possible alternatives to present situation. 
To our knowledge, we are the first to model a concept that completely solves the 
problem of dilution. It does not merely solve the problem but maintains the benefits that 
provided the old system: such as attracting funds and keeping investment opportunities for 
companies. In this new model it is forbidden for companies to issue new stocks. At a first 
glimpse, our suggestion banning new equity issues may seem cutting of our heads to cure a 
headache but if we take a closely look to the alternatives we offer in that situation we will 
have a complete picture of the model. The keystone of this model is that firms are only 
allowed to split existing shares rather than issue new ones. For instance, if in current model a 
company has let’s suppose 1000 shares of outstanding and issues extra 1000 shares and sell 
them, in our new model the firm can split each share let’s say to 2 shares and 1000 shares of 
the company will become 2000 shares without changing the owners of shares. If a 
shareholder had 50 shares, now he would have 100 shares. In contrast to present model that 
the company sells new issued shares, in this new model, only owners can sell their shares in 
the secondary market. And all secondary market will be kind of “taxed” by companies. We 
know that there is a capital gain tax in many countries for shareholders who sell their shares 
in the secondary market. Shareholders contribute certain percent of the profit they get from 
selling shares in the same logic. Every day people make billions of dollars through trading in 
stock markets. If shareholders don’t mind pay capital gain taxes to the state who doesn’t have 
direct impact on getting the profit for shareholders, they should not mind giving away a part 
of the profit to a company that actually makes the whole profit for its shareholders. These 
contributions can accumulate in an investment fund inside the company to serve its future 
development projects. To show the model in the imaginary way, we had better depict it a in a 
form of cake. If current model adds pieces from outside the cake (company), suggested model 
cuts the cake further into new pieces instead of adding new pieces. This approach can be first 
accepted by companies that are concerned of their shareholders rights to property, thus 
boosting their reputation of protecting their investors’ interests regardless of the size of 
investment. In the second level, when we see such model works in practice, it could be done 
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in legal level imposing all companies as an anti-dilution effective mechanism of protection. 
Although this model is yet in raw condition, we believe that the model can prove its 
effectiveness in action when it gets successful examination of time. 
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APPENDIX 
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited and The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
Limited take no responsibility for the contents of this announcement, make no 
representation as to its accuracy or completeness and expressly disclaim any liability 
whatsoever for any loss howsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any 
part of the contents of this announcement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
ADJUSTMENTS TO MINIMUM ISSUE PRICE AND 
 
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF 
 
SHARES TO BE ISSUED UNDER THE 
 
NON-PUBLIC ISSUANCE OF A SHARES 
 
References are made to (i) the announcements of Metallurgical Corporation of China 
Ltd.* (the “Company”) dated 19 February 2016 and 20 April 2016 and the circular of 
the Company dated 4 March 2016, in relation to, among others, the adjusted plan on 
the non-public issuance of A shares of the Company (the “Issuance Plan”), and (ii) 
the supplemental circular of the Company dated 5 April 2016 and the announcements 
of the Company dated 20 April 2016 and 28 April 2016, in relation to, among others, 
the profit distribution plan of the Company for the year 2015 and its implementation. 
 
Pursuant to the Issuance Plan, the issue price of the non-public issuance of A shares of 
the Company (the “Non-Public Issuance”) shall be not less than RMB3.85 per share, 
and the number of shares to be issued shall not exceed 2,548,716,883 shares. In the 
event that there is any ex-rights or ex-dividends event of A shares of the Company 
such as distribution of dividends, issuance of bonus shares or capitalisation from 
capital reserve, etc. during the period from the price benchmark date to the date of the 
issuance under the Non-Public Issuance, the minimum issue price and the maximum 
number of shares to be issued under the Non-Public Issuance will be adjusted 
correspondingly. 
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So far, the profit distribution in respect of the A shares of the Company for the year 
2015 has been completed. Adjustments are now made to the minimum issue price and 
the maximum number of shares to be issued under the Non-Public Issuance as follows: 
1. The price benchmark date of the Non-Public Issuance is the date of the 
announcement in relation to the resolutions passed at the eighteenth meeting of 
the second session of the board of directors of the Company (namely, 20 
February 2016), and the minimum issue price before adjustment was RMB3.85 
per share. Pursuant to the profit distribution plan of the Company for the year 
2015, the Company proposed to distribute a cash dividend of RMB0.055 per 
share (tax inclusive). Upon completion of the distribution, the minimum issue 
price of the Non-Public Issuance will be adjusted to RMB3.80 per share. The 
detailed calculation is as follows: Post-adjustment minimum issue price = Pre-
adjustment minimum issue price – Cash dividend per share = RMB3.85 per 
share – RMB0.055 per share = RMB3.795 per share, which is rounded up to 
RMB3.80 per share. 
2. The number of shares to be issued: The number of shares to be issued under the 
Non-Public Issuance before adjustment was not more than 2,548,716,883 shares. 
Upon completion of the implementation of the profit distribution plan of the 
Company for the year 2015, the maximum number of shares to be issued under 
the Non-Public Issuance will be adjusted to 2,582,252,631 shares. The detailed 
calculation is as follows: Post-adjustment maximum number of shares to be 
issued = Pre-adjustment maximum number of shares to be issued × Pre-
adjustment minimum issue price ÷ Post-adjustment minimum issue price = 
2,548,716,883 shares × RMB3.85 per share ÷ RMB3.80 per share = 
2,582,252,631 shares (rounded down to a whole number). 
 
Save for the above adjustments, other relevant matters in relation to the Non-Public 
Issuance remain unchanged. 
 
By order of the Board  
Metallurgical Corporation of China 
Ltd.*  
Lin Xiaohui  
Company Secretary 
Beijing, the PRC  
6 May 2016 
 
As at the date of the announcement, the Board of the Company comprises two executive directors: Mr. 
Guo Wenqing and Mr. Zhang Zhaoxiang; two non-executive directors: Mr. Jing Tianliang and Mr. 
Lin Jinzhen; and three independent non-executive directors: Mr. Yu Hailong, Mr. Ren Xudong and 
Mr. Chan Ka Keung Peter. 
